Iain Macdonald’s response to Peter Gordon’s Adorno and Existence.

At the intersection of metaphysics and social theory, this book presents and examines Adorno's unusual concept of possibility and aims to answer how we are to articulate the possibility of a redeemed life without lapsing into a vague and naïve utopianism.

L’oeuvre de Theodor W. Adorno, et plus particulièrement sa Théorie esthétique, témoigne de sa défense soutenue de l’art moderne. Toutefois, dans le cadre de ses réflexions, on ne doit pas oublier qu’elle comporte également une dimension critique. Sa polémique à propos du jazz, par exemple, est devenue célèbre. Par contraste, sa critique de la peinture monochrome demeure relativement inconnue. Ce texte propose d’abord d’esquisser les éléments de celle-ci afin de tester ensuite ses limites en analysant une oeuvre monochrome d’Yves Klein: (...) IKB 79.Theodor W. Adorno’s defence of modern art in Aesthetic Theory and other writings is well known, as is his scathing attack on jazz. Less well known is his critique of monochromatic painting. This article first sketches the stakes and terms of this critique in relation to Clement Greenberg’s dismissal of much monochromatic or near-monochromatic painting, before moving on to an analysis of Adorno’s position. For the purposes of this analysis, Yves Klein’s IKB 79 serves as a test case. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Jean-Michel Salanskis’ La gauche et l’égalité surveys a number of well-known principles of leftist thought in order to criticize certain illusions to which it falls prey, but also in order to renew its most essential motivation: the search for equality. However, in so doing, Salanskis deploys an ambiguous and problematic notion of possibility that threatens the coherence of his project. The present study analyzes aspects of Salanskis’ book, taking possibility as a guiding thread, and proposes adjustments that may help (...) to avoid certain classic pitfalls in the history of dialectical thinking. (shrink)

This collection of essays explores the conflictual history and future implications of two important traditions of twentieth-century European thought: the ...

Adorno's remarks on the philosophy of history are scattered throughout his works. Perhaps the most important passages are to be found in Negative Dialectics and the 1964–1965 lectures on History and Freedom, as well as in texts such as Dialectic of Enlightenment and the essays on “The Idea of Natural‐History,” “Progress,” and “The Meaning of Working through the Past.” However, these works do not constitute anything like a complete theory. Nevertheless, many themes and references recur in Adorno's writings, allowing for (...) a selectively thematic reconstruction of the most central lines of argument. The present text brings together a few concepts and problems from Adorno's readings of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, mainly, in order to provide the reader with a general picture of what is at issue. (shrink)

In what follows, I present my replies to Nicholas Walker, Taylor Carman, and Peter Gordon's reflections on my What Would Be Different? Figures of Possibility in Adorno. I begin by summarizing what is at stake in the book. My reply to Nicholas Walker and Taylor Carman focusses on Adorno's criticisms of Heidegger, who claims that the history of metaphysics has blocked our access to an “other beginning” for thinking. This prepares the ground for a comparison of Adorno's and Heidegger's notions (...) of what I call “blocked possibility.” My reply to Peter Gordon clarifies the relation of “blocked possibility” to actuality and, more specifically, to the actuality of happiness in Adorno's writings. (shrink)

In the final lines of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel makes the complex claim that the contingency of history and the science of knowing in the sphere of appearance together constitute a “conceptual history” (begriffene Geschichte, a ‘conceptually comprehended’ history). What is this suggestive but frustratingly obscure formula meant to convey? The question is vexing, not least because the Phenomenology itself is neither a philosophy of history nor a philosophical history in any traditional sense; it rather takes the form of (...) a quasi-historical narrative that picks up on the difficult problem of philosophy’s relation to history. For this reason, the attempt to understand what Hegel might mean by the term may be helped along by a critical analysis of selected aspects of his philosophy of history. The limits of the question therefore go beyond the specific project of the Phenomenology, though answering the question will involve returning to one of the central themes of that book, namely, the concept of experience (Erfahrung). The aim here is not so much to evaluate Hegel’s theory of world history as it is to gain a better understanding of how in general he understands historical knowledge in relation to philosophical knowledge of the absolute—a central concern throughout his career. (shrink)

According to a longstanding metaphysical tradition, actuality is prior and in some ways superior to possibility. From Aristotle to Hegel, the exceptions to this fundamental belief are fairly rare; but there is a marked trend in post-Hegelian thought to undermine this traditional priority, with Theodor W. Adorno representing an important line of attack. Here, the guiding question is: how does Adorno take issue with Hegel's version of the thesis on the subordination of possibility to actuality? Indeed, certain key aspects of (...) Adorno's utopianism can only be understood as a reaction to Hegel's theory of actuality. Specifically, Adorno defends a type of possibility that has no place in Hegel's system and so, in essence, sketches a revised dialectical theory of modality. (shrink)

(1998). Utopia and the place of possibility: Peter Handke and the ambitions of a storyteller 1 . Angelaki: Vol. 3, Impurity, authenticity and humanity, pp. 137-144.

Certaines lectures récentes de Hegel ont mis l’accent sur la dimension sociale de la philosophie de Hegel afin de parer les exagérations et les méprises courantes concernant son idéalisme. Robert Brandom, par exemple, a relevé des «thèmes pragmatiques dans l’idéalisme de Hegel». Mais une question d’ordre général se pose: cette stratégie déflationniste rend-elle réellement justice à la pensée de Hegel? Qu’advient-il des conditions logiques requises pour la connaissance et l’action, auxquelles Hegel attache beaucoup d’importance, et comment ces conditions cadrent-elles avec (...) les dimensions naturelles et sociales de l’expérience? En tablant sur des passages de l’Encyclopédie et d’autres textes, le présent article argumente en faveur d’un transcendantalisme modeste chez Hegel, afin d’éviter la rectification exagérée qui consiste à réduire le concept du concept chez Hegel à un réseau de pratiques sociales. (shrink)

When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to use one’s own understanding independently of dominant heteronomous patterns of thought. This Kantian-sounding claim is essentially an exhortation: maturity demands self-liberation from heteronomy, i.e. autonomy. The problem, however, is that in spite of Adorno’s general endorsement of Kant’s definition of maturity, he ultimately rejects the corresponding Kantian definition of autonomy. Yet Adorno does not simply discard the Kantian concept of autonomy. On (...) the contrary, he will try to correct it by returning to it what it lacks, namely, intimacy or ‘live contact with the warmth of things’. In this gesture, he aims to restore to autonomy its ethical substance or lived ethical context, not as a mere supplement to the purity of duty, but rather as necessary to the very process of becoming mature. This article examines Adorno’s concept of maturity in the context of the dialectical relationship between autonomy and intimacy. (shrink)

An introduction to a special issue of Symposium on normativity and freedom.

(2011). ‘What Is, Is More than It Is’: Adorno and Heidegger on the Priority of Possibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 31-57. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2011.539357.

This paper addresses the question of normativity in Hegel by examining the role of ‘undialectical’ resistance to dialectical development. Beginning with a general overview of dialectical normativity and what it might mean to be ‘undialectical,’ the focus then shifts to a privileged example in Hegel’s writings: Sophocles’ Antigone. The central claim of the paper is the following: The very contradictions that fuel dialectical normativity can also trap individuals within an obsolete actuality, without immediate hope of escape. Indeed, the irreducible dependence (...) of dialectical thinking upon the actions and decisions of individual consciousness expose it to the threat of continual stasis or regression. This ineliminable possibility of failure is what is here called the ‘undialectical’ moment of the dialectic, which Hegel understands rather as a negative condition of possibility of freedom and rationality. (shrink)

Hegel's concepts of force and power (absolute power, absolute force, infinite power, the power of the negative, the power of the Concept, etc.), scattered throughout the works, are doubled by other passages where Hegel speaks of various forms of impotence or powerlessness (Ohnmacht). What is powerlessness? In effect, for Hegel, powerlessness generally designates a defect or a deficiency, or a kind of laziness or contingent immaturity that prevents the Concept from fully realizing itself, even though its power is, on another (...) level, absolute. Powerlessness (Ohnmacht) is a lack of power (Macht). But how is absolute power related to a relative lack of power? If power is absolute, then why is it that a little power isn’t always enough? Or alternatively, why does powerlessness have a role to play at all in a system where the power of the Concept determines everything inexorably? How do these two terms relate to each other in Hegel’s thought, especially in the context of the Subjective Logic? (shrink)

Iain Macdonald suggests that, in spite of their differences, Adorno and Heidegger are alike in advancing what he calls critiques of actuality and “models of redemptive possibility.” I argue that that similarity is superficial in light of the difference between their conceptions of actuality and possibility. For Adorno, as for the metaphysical tradition since Aristotle, possibility and necessity are defined in terms of actuality. The privileging of actuality, Heidegger maintains, foregrounds entities and obscures the question of being.

Iain Macdonald suggests that, in spite of their differences, Adorno and Heidegger are alike in advancing what he calls critiques of actuality and “models of redemptive possibility.” I argue that that similarity is superficial in light of the difference between their conceptions of actuality and possibility. For Adorno, as for the metaphysical tradition since Aristotle, possibility and necessity are defined in terms of actuality. The privileging of actuality, Heidegger maintains, foregrounds entities and obscures the question of being.

The Thin Red Line is the third feature-length film from acclaimed director Terrence Malick, set during the struggle between American and Japanese forces for Guadalcanal in the South Pacific during World War Two. It is a powerful, enigmatic and complex film that raises important philosophical questions, ranging from the existential and phenomenological to the artistic and technical. This is the first collection dedicated to exploring the philosophical aspects of Malick’s film. Opening with a helpful introduction that places the film in (...) context, five essays, four of which were specially commissioned for this collection, go on to examine the following: the exploration of Heideggerian themes – such as being-towards-death and the vulnerability of Dasein’s world – in The Thin Red Line how Malick’s film explores and cinematically expresses the embodied nature of our experience of, and agency in, the world Malick’s use of cinematic techniques, and how the style of his images shapes our affective, emotional, and cognitive responses to the film the role that images of nature play in Malick’s cinema, and his ‘Nietzschean’ conception of human nature. The Thin Red Line is essential reading for students interested in philosophy and film or phenomenology and existentialism. It also provides an accessible and informative insight into philosophy for those in related disciplines such as film studies, literature and religion. Contributors: Simon Critchley, Hubert Dreyfus and Camilo Prince, David Davies, Amy Coplan, Iain Macdonald. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics.

Peter Gordon’s response to Espen Hammer, Gordon Finlayson, and Iain Macdonald.

Há um discurso teórico que denuncia a igualdade formal presente no ideal de Estado de Direito como um manto ideológico a serviço do conservadorismo. Por debaixo desse manto, as profundas desigualdades sociais e relações de opressão seriam legitimadas como se fossem simplesmente fruto da aplicação imparcial das regras jurídicas a que todos estariam igualmente submetidos. Embora essa crítica sirva quando direcionada ao modelo de Estado de Direito defendido por Hayek, que apresenta falsamente as regras oriundas dos costumes e dos precedentes (...) como isentas de posições políticas, ela não atinge da mesma maneira o modelo de Estado de Direito centrado na supremacia da legislação. Apesar de todas as limitações que podem ser reconhecidas no ideal de igualdade formal, a sua recusa parece antes permitir novas e mais graves formas de opressão do que as suprimir. (shrink)

This book makes a novel contribution to our understanding of Romance SE constructions by combining both diachronic and synchronic theoretical perspectives along with a range of empirical data from different languages and dialects. The collection, divided into four sections, proposes that SE constructions may be divided into one class that is the result of grammaticalization of a reflexive pronoun up the syntactic tree, from Voice and above, and another class that has resulted from the reanalysis of reflexive and anticausative morphemes (...) as an argument expletive or verbal morpheme generated in positions from Voice and below. The contributions, while varied in both empirical content and theoretical approach, all serve to highlight different aspects of the overarching idea that SE constructions have evolved from these two distinct grammaticalization paths. The book appeals to researchers and academics in the field and closes with a unified approach to various SE constructions that makes important use of its status as a verbal morpheme. In addition to aligning a novel string of empirical contributions under a new theoretical umbrella, a clear research direction emerges from this volume based on the morphosyntactic nature of SE itself: Is it a clitic, an agreement morpheme, or a verbal morpheme? (shrink)

This book illustrates the extent to which Kant's work has permeated wide areas of learning, across many disciplines, despite a general ignorance, especially in...

This volume brings together a selection of Iain Hampsher-Monk's writings on questions of historicity and rationality in political theory, together with a substantial introduction written for the volume. There are two loci around which the work revolves - one is the relationship between history and philosophy in the analysis of key concepts such as liberty, democracy and toleration, the other is the role of reason in political science's explanations. Despite a background in PPE, the author played a major role (...) in the 'historical', revolution in political theory. Here, his reflections on the historicity of concepts in political science are presented alongside articles dealing with the role and limitations of economic modes of rationality in social and political theorising. Unifying these themes is a commitment to an understanding of human action as conscious and essentially meaning-bearing and the case for a human science rooted in such self-understandings. 'Accessible by specialists and non-specialists alike, Iain Hampsher-Monk's essays illustrate the author's broad intellectual profile, crossing borders between the history of political thought and other forms of political theorising; normative and interpretative forms of political theory; or political theory and political economy. Though he works mainly in the Anglophone tradition, Hampsher-Monk applies himself to continental styles of thinking and writing, such as the history of concepts. Rather than leave the study of political institutions to empiricists, he deals with them as subject of political theorising - a valuable point.' Kari Palonen, University of Jyvaskyla 'Iain Hampsher-Monk is one of our leading historians of political thought. These remarkable essays display his range and erudition, and demonstrate why the study of political thought remains an essential basis for understanding politics.' Andrew Gamble, Queens' College Cambridge". (shrink)